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We argue that compensating losers is more difficult for immigration than for trade and capital 
movements. While a tax-cum-subsidy mechanism allows the government to turn the gains from trade 
into a Pareto improvement, the same is not true for the so-called immigration surplus, if the 
redistributive mechanism is not allowed to discriminate against migrants. We discuss policy conclusions 
to be drawn from this fundamental asymmetry between migration and other forms of globalization. 
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Rich countries typically protect their labor markets trough relatively tight restrictions on immigration, and 
they are typically more hesitant to enter international obligations for migration than they are for trade and 
capital flows. Yet, migration holds a huge potential for efficiency gains through migration, which implies a 
reallocation of labor towards countries with a higher marginal value productivity. 
However, aggregate efficiency gains mask potentially unwelcome distributional effects. Arguably, 
compensating losers is an important part of any strategy to “save globalization”, and it seems particularly 
important to secure the gains from international migration, since political resistance to immigration largely 
stems from alleged distributional effects. 
Economists routinely point out that a simple redistributive mechanism of indirect goods and factor taxes 
can be used to turn gains from trade into a Pareto improvement. In many cases, efficiency gains may 
either be reaped through trade or factor movements. For instance, in the European integration may take 
place either through trade, or through labor flowing from east to west or a reverse movement of capital. 
Does the mechanism of Pareto improving redistribution that works for trade also work for immigration? 
We show that gains from migration are much harder to turn into a Pareto improvement than gains from 
trade or gains from capital flows, for two reasons. First, unlike trade and capital flows, international 
migration involves movement of people. Secondly, any attempt to redistribute income from winners to 
losers in the immigration country is likely to be subject to a non-discrimination constraint, meaning that the 
redistributive mechanism must not discriminate against a person on the basis of ethnicity, or the status of 
being a migrant. Intuitively, with immigration this requires “perverse compensation”. Immigrants surely 
belong to the winners of migration. Yet, in the receiving country they are indistinguishable, except for 
ethnicity, from native workers who suffer a loss and will, thus, be eligible for positive transfers. Non-
discrimination then implies that the redistributive mechanism also works to the advantage of migrants. It is 
obvious that the efficiency gain from migration simply may not be large enough to pay for this “perverse 
compensation” in a Pareto improving redistribution. 
We first show that discriminatory factor taxation has implications for a country’s optimal policy with respect 
to migration and capital flows, even absent any distributive concern within a country. If such discrimination 
is possible, then a large, relatively capital abundant economy has an incentive to allow for immigration, 
and to restrict, or ban, capital exports. With a non-discrimination constraint, it has an opposite incentive. 
We then use general equilibrium model to show that a capital abundant economy that receives a labor 
inflow, even though it does receive an immigration surplus, cannot rely on redistributive mechanisms to 
achieve a Pareto improvement, unless it discriminates against immigrants. The non-discrimination 
constraint negates a Pareto improving compensation of losers from immigration. This suggests that 
lowering destination countries’ resistance against immigration may require relaxation of the non-
discrimination constraint for redistributive policies. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Most people would argue that migration is the most difficult form of economic 
globalization, because it involves movement of people. It separates families and poses 
challenges of cultural diversity and social integration that are largely absent in other forms 
of globalization, say trade in goods and services, or capital movements. For these reasons, 
international migration receives special “treatment” in the international “rules of 
globalization”. We have the WTO that governs trade in goods and services, and to some 
extent foreign direct investment, and we have the IMF watching over mobility of financial 
capital and foreign exchange markets. It is striking that there is no comparable institution of 
international surveillance and cooperation/“enforcement” regarding international migration; 
see Hatton (2007). Countries are conspicuously less willing to enter international 
obligations on migration than they are with respect to trade and capital movements. Indeed, 
retaining unrestricted national sovereignty in governing the inflow of foreign labor is 
commonly regarded as a “natural right” of every country; see Freeman (2006). The same is 
not true for trade and capital movements. Almost throughout the entire world, national 
labor markets are less open than markets for goods and financial assets. Rich countries’ 
labor markets are typically protected by relatively tight restrictions on immigration, 
although sometimes in strange alliance with active recruitment for specific types of workers 
to alleviate certain shortages in the domestic labor market; see Hatton (2007). 
In a similar vein, regional (or preferential) agreements are typically focused on liberalizing 
trade and FDI, more than on lifting immigration restrictions vis à vis member countries. 
The EU is a telling case. While freedom of labor movements was envisaged already in the 
Treaty of Rome signed in 1957, it took until the Single European Act of 1987 for member 
countries to start being serious about it. In contrast, free trade through the customs union 
had already been completed by 1968. And when the Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CCECs) opened up to the West in 1989/90, the subsequent attempts launched by 
EU countries towards a speedy integration of these countries through the so-called Europe 
Agreements were, again, mainly focused on trade liberalization and FDI. Indeed, enhanced 
trade was partly seen as a vehicle to avoid migration; see Layard et al. (1992).
1 Even more 
 
1 Similar arguments have also played a role with respect to the US and Mexico in the political process leading 
to ratification of the NAFTA agreement.  
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strikingly, when some of the CEECs finally became members of the EU in 2004, the 
majority of incumbent countries have insisted on transitional agreements allowing them to 
keep their immigration restrictions vis à vis new member countries for a period of up to 
seven years, in blunt violation of existing EU law (Single Market); see also Boeri & 
Brücker (2005). 
Yet, migration holds a huge potential for efficiency gains through reallocation of labor 
towards employment with higher marginal value productivity. Thus, the World Bank 
estimates that increasing the immigrant share in the high income countries’ labor force from 
6.0 to 8.8 percent by 2025 would generate a cumulative real income increase (at PPP) equal 
to 0.64 percent of world GNP. By far the largest share of this would accrue to migrants 
themselves, who would benefit from a real income increase of as much as 200 percent, 
while the net gain to natives in the receiving and sending countries would be 0.36 percent 
and 0.86 percent, respectively, of their GNP; see World Bank (2006).
2 For the 2004 
enlargement of the EU, somewhat larger migration flows have been calculated, at least for 
countries like Germany and Austria, with simulated net gains well above one percent of the 
receiving country’s GNP; see Kohler (2004). 
However, as with other forms of economic globalization, these aggregate net gains mask 
distributional effects. Within the sending and the receiving country, there are typically 
winners and losers from migration. In such cases, economists almost routinely invoke the 
notion of compensation, in order to identify whether a certain change, say an inflow of 
labor, is beneficial to the economy at large. If winners could use some of their gain to 
compensate losers, such that nobody is left worse off, then economists speak of a Pareto-
improvement. It is in this sense that statements about a potential welfare gain from 
globalization scenarios are to be interpreted.  
In all likelihood, however, winners will not be sufficiently altruistic and/or well-informed 
for such compensation to happen without some form of government interference. Markets 
left to themselves are good at bringing about Pareto-optimal situations, but they do not (and 
are not meant to) care about winners and losers when forcing decentralized adjustment 
through the price mechanism. That is a job we usually assign to governments. Political 
 
2 It should be pointed out here that in this statement migrants are to be interpreted as new migrants. According 
to the Word Bank simulation, pre-existing foreign workers (i.e., earlier migrants) are revealed to suffer a 6 
percent real income loss. See also Winters, Walmesley, Wang & Grynberg (2003).   
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systems and/or governments should thus be judged on their ability to pursue efficiency-
enhancing policies, coupled with mechanisms to compensate losers, so as to achieve a 
Pareto improvement.
 3  
The mere potential of such compensation will, of course, not be enough to sustain political 
support of a policy, say a policy of opening domestic markets to globalization. It is worth 
remembering at this stage that, contrary to wide-spread belief, the first wave of economic 
globalization about 100 years ago did not abruptly grind to a halt due to the outbreak of the 
Great War in 1914. It had been undermined much earlier through a gradual erosion of 
political support, because of distributional changes; see Hatton & Williamson (2005). It 
thus seems natural to view actual compensation of losers as an important ingredient of any 
strategy to “save globalization”, although it will probably not be enough; see Davidson, 
Matusz & Nelson (2007) and Rodrik (2007a,2007b). The same probably holds true for past 
and future enlargements of the EU, and it does so for both, incumbent and new countries. 
If actual compensation of losers is important to secure efficiency gains from globalization, 
this begs two important questions. What does a practical compensation mechanism look 
like? And is compensation easier to achieve for some forms of globalization than for 
others? We shall argue in this paper that migration is special in that compensation is indeed 
systematically more difficult to achieve than with trade and capital movements. In many 
cases the same efficiency gains may be achieved through either trade, capital movements, 
or migration. Focusing on such cases, we show that, while trade and capital movements are 
amenable to a practical compensation mechanism that allows for a Pareto improvement, 
this same compensation mechanism is typically infeasible for a migration scenario. 
The key difference that causes problems with compensation arises from the simple fact, 
emphasized at the outset, that migration involves movement of people, which is not the case 
with trade and capital movements.
4 It has long been recognized that this causes problems 
for welfare statements, since it also changes the welfare constituencies, i.e., the groups of 
people that we consider as constituting a country whose welfare we are interested in; see 
 
3 Notice the difference between a Pareto-optimal situation and a Pareto improvement. In a Pareto-optimal 
situation, by definition, no Pareto-improvement is possible. However, a movement from a Pareto-inefficient 
to a Pareto-optimal situation may well make some people worse off, although it is clearly enhancing 
efficiency. 
4 Of course, capital movements may take place in combination with migration. Moreover, some forms of trade 




Bhagwati & Srinivasan (2003). Our point, however, is more subtle. It has to do with the 
mechanism of compensation that the receiving country may employ in an attempt to turn 
the efficiency gain from immigration into a Pareto improvement for its people, whereby we 
consider immigrants to be part of the receiving country. Whatever the details of such a 
mechanism, we argue that in almost any immigration country it is likely to be subject to a 
non-discrimination constraint, meaning that any discrimination solely on the grounds of a 
person being a migrant is ruled out.  
The tax-cum-subsidy (TCS) mechanism introduced by Dixit & Norman (1980,1986) to 
discuss compensation with respect to the gains from trade satisfies this non-discrimination 
constraint. While the mechanism works fine for trade, we show that it fails to turn the 
aggregate net benefit from immigration into a Pareto improvement for the receiving 
country. Our point is relatively easy to establish for the Dixit-Norman mechanism of TCS, 
but as will become evident, it is more general. 
It is obvious that this asymmetry between migration and other forms of globalization might 
partly explain the observed preference of trade and capital movements over migration that 
we have mentioned above. A different explanation, which also works through a non-
discrimination constraint in redistributive policies has been put forward by Wellisch & 
Walz (1998). They assume an egalitarian policy to start with, whereby the level of 
redistribution is determined so as to maximize a social welfare function, which is assumed 
to be identical across countries. Moreover, they assume a priori that mobile labor is on the 
recipient side of this policy, which is paid for by the other factor, assumed to be immobile 
across countries. By construction of the model, immigration will always involve an inflow 
of welfare recipients. Other things equal, this makes achieving a given level of utility for 
these workers more costly, provided that foreign workers may not be denied access to the 
redistributive policy. Obviously, trade becomes a preferred form of globalization over 
migration. Our approach is more general in that we do not rely on a social welfare function. 
Instead, we only assume that policy is interested in Pareto improvement. As will become 
evident, our approach is also much more general in terms of the type of labor movement 
allowed, and we also compare migration to capital movements, in addition to trade. 
In a recent paper, Hammond & Sempere (2006) have dealt with the issue of perfect 
substitutability of trade and international migration from a normative perspective, also  
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addressing compensation. They prove the existence of a Pareto improving Walrasian 
equilibrium with migration, relative to a status quo with trade alone, under a suitable 
redistribution rule. Their proof overcomes the problem that labor mobility as a form of 
globalization, unlike trade, is likely to generate non-convexities in the sets of feasible plans 
for households that have to do with the need to move across space to sell small units of 
one’s labor in locations with different wage rates. In their redistribution rule, however, 
Hammond and Sempere do not enforce a non-discrimination restriction of the sort that we 
emphasize in this paper. 
The paper develops our argument in three sections. In section 2, we first discuss issues and 
concepts of compensation in a general way. Section 3 then treats implications that follow 
from the non-discrimination constraint when a country attempts to pursue “national 
advantage” through restrictive policies towards capital movements and migration. In 
section 3 we do not yet bother about compensating of losers from such policies. Section 4 
then turns to compensation, demonstrating the impossibility of achieving a Pareto 
improvement through a TCS mechanism of compensation in a small country receiving an 
exogenous inflow of foreign labor. Section 5 closes the paper with a brief summary and 
some policy conclusions. 
2.  On Compensation 
 
In scenarios like migration where one must expect distributional effects, any reference to 
aggregate welfare based on individual preferences must rely on a compensation argument, 
unless one is willing to specify a Bergson-Samuelson-type social welfare function. In turn, 
the notion of compensation implies jurisdictions with redistributive power. Any satisfactory 
welfare analysis must reflect the jurisdictional environment in which compensation takes 
place. In the context of migration, there are but two such jurisdictions, i.e., the sending and 
receiving country. For some purposes it may be useful to treat migrants’ well-being as part 
of the sending country’s welfare, as suggested by Bhagwati & Srinivasan (1983). But 
considering issues of compensation, this seems questionable. The real-world status quo is 
that (legal) migrants leave their home country jurisdiction and enter the host country's  
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jurisdiction. In the following, we therefore treat migrants as subject to the immigration 
country’s mechanism of compensating losers from scenarios of globalization.
5
For trade integration, there is an elaborate theory of compensation that identifies ways of 
turning efficiency gains from trade into Pareto improvements for each country involved. 
Importantly, the required compensatory schemes are purely national and do not involve 
international transfers. Earlier treatments have relied on lump-sum compensation; see 
Samuelson (1962). However, lump-sum measures suffer from the fact that individuals have 
no incentive to reveal their true gains and losses. They have a clear incentive to overreport 
losses and underreport gains. On the grounds of technical feasibility, we therefore do not 
consider compensation through lump-sum transfers any further in this paper. 
Dixit & Norman (1980,1986) have shown that the gains from trade may be turned into a 
Pareto improvements also by means of indirect commodity and factor taxation, which 
requires no more than observing the two price systems, respectively, in the two situations 
considered.
6 Arguably, this is still quite demanding, but it is clearly much more satisfactory 
than the notion of lump-sum compensation. It is striking that a comparable theory of 
compensation is lacking for gains from factor flows. A possible explanation might be that 
for Heckscher-Ohlin models trade and factor flows are widely regarded to be substitutes 
regarding the efficiency and factor price effects; see the classic treatment by Mundell 
(1957).
7 It may therefore seem natural to assume that they are equivalent also with respect 
to the possibility of a TCS-type compensation towards a Pareto improvement. Our 
subsequent analysis will show that this is true for capital flows, but not for migration. 
The principle advantage of a tax-cum-subsidy (TCS) scheme is that it does not target 
individuals. It is thus less demanding in terms of information. Specifically, it does not 
require knowledge of private information, such as individual gains or losses. Hence, it does 
not suffer from the lack of an incentive to tell the truth about individual affectedness. The 
specific TCS system envisaged by Dixit & Norman (1980,1986) for a trade scenario relies 
 
5 Throughout this paper migration is always meant to be legal migration. 
6 Focusing on a dynamic setting with investment in skill formation, Willman (2003) shows that a lump-sum 
compensation scheme may lead to strategic underinvestment that dissipates all gains from trade. Incentive 
problems arising (particularly in labor markets) even with tax-cum-subsidy schemes are discussed in Feenstra 
(2004, pp. 184ff). 
7 Of course, the case of perfect substitution does not arise under all conceivable circumstances. The crucial 




                                                
on observations of “pre- and post-trade” goods and factor prices in the country concerned.
8 
The TCS system is used in order to expose households to pre-trade (or autarchy) prices, 
thus ensuring the Pareto criterion, while exposing the production sector to post-trade prices, 
thus securing the efficiency gains. Feasibility of a Pareto improvement is guaranteed, if the 
TCS system satisfies the government budget constraint. Importantly, the Dixit-Norman 
TCS system is strictly national and does not involve any international transfer. Moreover, it 
achieves compensation without apparent discrimination based on individual characteristics. 
The Dixit-Norman result thus marks a major break-through, and it is still considered part 
and parcel of the celebrated gains from trade theorem. It suggests that Pareto superiority is 
a  practically relevant argument of desirability for globalization scenarios that promise 
efficiency gains. 
What seems to have gone unnoticed, however, is that this view does not extend to 
immigration scenarios, if the TCS mechanism is applied on an equal footing to natives and 
migrants. It probably safe to argue that consensus about political correctness, and 
sometimes even constitutional provisions, require that the host country's TCS system not 
discriminate against a person on the basis of ethnicity, or the status of being a migrant. We 
may speak of a non-discrimination constraint. When a Dixit-Norman-type TCS system is 
used to turn gains from trade into a Pareto improvement, this constraint will never be 
binding, but for migration it is. 
Why should migration be different? The intuition is best illustrated for the extreme case of 
autarchy versus free trade. Thus, let us compare a scenario where migration leads to the 
same goods and factor prices (equalized across countries) as which otherwise be achieved 
through free trade, in each case compared to complete autarchy. We take the simple case of 
a 2x2x2-Heckscher-Ohlin world with capital and a single type of labor. According to the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the trade scenario holds a real income gain for workers in the 
labor abundant country. In the migration scenario, the same income change is brought 
about by some labor moving from the labor abundant to the capital abundant economy. 
Hence, the redistributive system must work to the disadvantage of (would be) migrants. At 
the same time, native workers in the receiving country who are perfect substitutes for 
 
8 The original proof in Dixit & Norman (1980, p.79) looks at the somewhat extreme comparison between free 
trade and autarchy, but the principle of compensation as such generalizes easily to more realistic scenarios 
that involve an efficiency gain.  
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immigrants will suffer a loss, again in both scenarios. Therefore, the compensation 
mechanism needs to work in their favor.  
Now, if compensation may not discriminate on the basis of a person being an immigrant, 
then we are obviously facing a problem. A TCS compensation mechanism requires that 
migrants should be taxed, while the non-discrimination restriction in their new country of 
residence, where workers lose, requires them to be subsidized. Moreover, if the TCS 
system is restricted to residents, then the sending country, in its attempt to compensate 
losers, suffers from the fact that migrants' income is beyond the reach of its own TCS 
system. The key question then is whether the efficiency gains are large enough to 
accommodate the restrictions, such that the migration scenario can similarly be turned into 
a Pareto improvement. We shall see in section 4 below that this in not the case. 
3.  Comparing capital movements and migration 
 
A “punchline” of our paper will be that discrimination against foreigners and/or foreign 
factor income may be conducive, or even necessary, for Pareto improving compensation, if 
a certain efficiency gain is brought about by factor movements instead of trade. This type of 
discriminatory taxation is not new to the literature on factor flows. In the 1980s, trade 
economists were interested in comparing the incentives and possibilities for countries to 
pursue their national advantage in cases where they could chose at will whether to restrict 
(or even ban) capital or labor movements. National advantage is defined as net gains to 
original residents. Although that literature is not concerned with compensating losers within 
any country, it nonetheless instructive to recall the principal insight, because that insight 
relies on the possibility of discrimination against foreign factor owners. This generates an 
asymmetry regarding the optimal policy between the two types of factor flows, even in a 
world where they are perfect substitutes as regards world-wide efficiency of factor 
allocation. 
To put our argument in a practical context, let us consider intra-European integration of the 
CEECs. It can be argued that, up to a point at least, efficiency can be increased either 
through western capital going east, or through eastern labor going west.
9 Let us assume, in 
 
9 The most obvious case where migration would always be necessary for efficiency is one where the west has 
a an absolute Ricardian advantage in productivity levels, as for instance assumed in Davis & Weinstein 
(2002) for US immigration.  
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typical Heckscher-Ohlin fashion, that the two types of factor movements are indeed perfect 
substitutes as regards efficient factor allocation. Suppose, moreover, that trade alone, for 
whatever reason, does not lead to international factor price equalization. If the countries 
considered are small in that they are unable to influence factor prices through restricting 
factor flows, then they have no incentive to favor one type of factor movement over the 
other, as far as the net gain for their initial factor owners is concerned. Note that initial 
factor owners do not include eastern migrants that might end up in the west. However, from 
the next section it will follow that this indifference will vanish once governments bother 
about compensation, in which case the west will favor capital outflows to labor inflows.  
But let us thus assume for the moment that compensation is no issue, and that the countries 
considered (east and west) are large. This means that investment of western capital in the 
east is subject to a diminishing capital rental. Moreover, the west may draw on eastern 
labor only subject to a rising wage rate.
10 This obviously generates an incentive for the 
west to impose restrictions on capital outflows and/or labor inflows. Let us first look at 
capital exports. As is well known, maximization of the national advantage requires that a 
large capital-exporting country restricts capital exports, say through a tax on capital income 
earned abroad, in order to ensure that the marginal return on exporting capital is equal to 
the marginal productivity of domestic employment of capital.
11 Suppose the optimal capital 
export is equal to  , generating a capital rental in the foreign economy equal to  . 
Given the capital export tax, it must be true that the domestic capital rental is  . 
Assuming for the sake of simplicity that technology is the same in both countries, this 
implies a lower aggregate foreign capital intensity 
e K * r
* rr <
* kk < , and a lower wage rate  .   * ww <
Suppose now that the foreign capital   is repatriated, and is employed domestically with 
an amount of foreign labor equal to 
e K
* e Kk, producing the same output as it did in the 
foreign economy before. Ruffin (2004) calls the operation of  e K  with  foreign     labor
* e Kk an “enclave production”. For the time being, we ignore the question of how such an 
enclave production might be supported institutionally. However, with an eye on the 
                                                 
10 , We thus rule out factor price insensitivity due to Rybczynski-type reallocation in the sending or receiving 
country, respectively; see Leamer (1995). 
11 Notice the difference here between the marginal return of employing capital (of whatever origin) in the 




distributional issue, we may note that this leaves everybody equally well off as with capital 
exports, although there will be distributional effects relative to the initial equilibrium. But 
there is now an inefficiency in that the aggregate capital intensity in the “enclave economy” 
is different from the aggregate capital intensity of the domestic economy. Obviously, letting 
the enclave economy be absorbed by the domestic economy through unified factor markets 
should lead to a more efficient allocation of resources. If the domestic government 
introduces a discriminatory wage tax on foreign labor, such that foreign workers earn a net-
of-tax wage rate equal to  , then all of this efficiency gain ultimately accrues to natives in 
the domestic economy, and foreign labor will not be made worse off. 
* w
The institutional setup that would support such a situation is a domestic ban on all capital 
exports, combined with a discriminatory wage tax   that ensures a net-of-tax wage rate 




12 Note that, by construction of the argument,   is the equilibrium wage rate 
that obtains in the east if 
* w
* e Kk  labor has emigrated to the west. Hence a suitable 
discriminatory wage tax on foreign labor employed in the domestic economy is the only 
instrument needed, in addition to a complete ban on capital exports, to support this 
equilibrium. The equilibrium condition for migration, requiring equality of the (net) wage 
rates for migrants, is satisfied in this equilibrium. Note, however, that  * e Kk need not be 
an  optimal inflow of foreign labor. The condition of an optimal labor inflow requires 
equality between the marginal productivity of foreign labor employed domestically, which 
is equal to (  in this equilibrium, and the marginal cost of foreign labor. Since by 
assumption the economy is large, the marginal cost of foreign labor to the domestic 
economy is larger than the prevailing wage rate abroad. Therefore, this condition may, but 
need not, be satisfied in the equilibrium just described. A first-best policy may require a 
further adjustment of the discriminatory wage tax  .
)
* 1 w tw + *




Now, given what we have said above about the feasibility of discriminating against 
immigrant labor, the policy just described must seem highly questionable, although it must 
be emphasized that the policy does not exploit the foreign economy, relative to the initial 
 
12 See also Bhagwati & Srinivasan (1983) and Calvo & Wellisz (1983) for a description of this policy 
experiment. The principal underlying insight of this result is due to Ramaswami (1968). 
13 Under plausible, conditions, the policy described above will also entail goods price adjustments, which we 
have ignored in our analysis. Arguably, the principal insight is independent from this complication.  
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equilibrium, which is remarkable. But the principal insight underlying the policy, originally 
framed in the previous setup by Ramaswami (1968), carries over to an economy that would 
export labor and import capital in a laissez faire equilibrium. In our framework, it is 
relatively easy to see that applying the above logic, mutatis mutandis, to the eastern 
economy leads to a ban on emigration, coupled with a suitable discriminatory taxation of 
capital income. Arguably, such discrimination is deemed less odious than discriminating 
against resident immigrants. Indeed, it seems implied by the destination principle of 
international capital taxation, where capital income originating in any one country receives 
different tax treatment, depending on the residence of the factor owner. But there is a 
difference between this type of discrimination and the one implied by the optimal capital 
import policy of the eastern country. This policy is equivalent to a destination principle of 
capital income taxation which is applied in a discriminatory way by the capital importing 
country at its own full discretion (and not the discretion of the west), and to its own national 
advantage. This is difficult to imagine. 
Obviously, the two countries’ optimal policies described above are mutually exclusive. 
Assuming that the optimal policy of the western country is ruled out by the non-
discrimination constraint, it still has an incentive to restrict capital exports, given the 
eastern country’s optimal policy with respect to capital inflows. One could now go on 
describing an equilibrium outcome of policies, assuming some form of strategic interaction 
between governments. However, this is unlikely to generate new insights for our point of 
concern, which is Pareto improvement. We therefore move on to issues of compensation.  
4.  Pareto improvement: An impossibility theorem 
 
Existing political consensus as well as constitutions typically rule out the optimal 
“Ramaswami-policy” of a relatively capital abundant economy. Moreover, a discriminatory 
taxation of foreign capital income, although arguably less odious in principle, seems 
difficult to achieve for a capital importing economy in a manner required by the 
“Ramaswami-policy”. Practically speaking, what we observe in the European context is a 
combination of both, a net labor inflow in the West and a net capital inflow in the East, 
both subject to policy influence, but not in single-minded pursuit of national advantage. 
What we also observe is governments that are to some extent worried by the distributional 
impacts of these factor flows.   
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Let us then assume that governments contemplate compensation of losers, but that they are 
constrained in doing so through “non-discrimination” as described above. We now ask a 
simple question: For an arbitrary inflow of labor into the capital abundant economy, will 
the government be able to implement a non-discriminatory mechanism of compensation, 
such that immigration will in the end be a Pareto improvement for natives of this economy? 
In some sense, the literature seems to presume the answer to be yes, since it stresses that 
any country experiencing some factor inflow which is different in composition from the 
initial factor endowment benefits from a welfare increase; see Ruffin (1984). For the case 
of immigration, this welfare increase has been called an immigration surplus; see Borjas 
(1995,1999). However, such an aggregate welfare increase will arise if and only if the 
factor inflow is absorbed with changes in factor prices; see Felbermayr & Kohler (2007). 
Speaking of an aggregate net gain to natives in the face of such factor price changes 
presupposes the possibility of some mechanism of compensation. For the gains from trade, 
economist routinely refer to the possibility of employing a TCS mechanism of the type 
introduced by Dixit & Norman (1980,1986), in order to achieve a Pareto improvement. For 
the immigration surplus, the literature has so far not bothered to address compensation at 
all, presumably on the grounds that what is possible for the gains from trade should equally 
be possible for the immigration surplus. It turns out that this is impossible, if the TCS 
mechanism is subject to a non-discrimination constraint. 
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that the economy in question produces many 
tradable goods with world prices  (denoted in vector form) under constant returns to scale 
and perfect competition. We assume that immigration does not change world market prices 
for traded goods. Moreover, we assume there are no non-traded goods, the country 
practices free trade, and there are no domestic distortions of any kind. This latter 
assumption is important, as it rules out second-best effects of immigration. We thus want to 
isolate the Pareto-improving potential of the “classic” immigration surplus. Denoting the 
economy’s fixed endowment with a vector  , its gross national product (GNP) may be 
described by a function  , which is convex in prices   and concave in endowments 
. The economy has an initial endowment   and now receives an exogenous inflow of 
foreign labor  . Note that we allow for many different types of labor with varying 
amounts of inflow, relative to initial endowments. We rule out any factor outflow for the 
p
v
(,) g pv p
v 0 v
0 Δ≥ v 
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moment. The vectors of factor prices before and after migration are denoted by   and  , 
respectively. Importantly these vectors include rentals for factors other than labor. 
0 w 1 w
Note the similarities and differences of this scenario, compared with the scenario 
underlying the conventional gains from trade theorem. The trade scenario allows the 
economy to draw on foreign goods markets with given goods prices, differing from the 
country’s autarchy prices. Trade flows are determined endogenously, subject to balanced 
trade and with given endowments. Our immigration scenario allows the economy to draw 
on the foreign labor market where wages are different. We could in principle also let v  
adjust endogenously to equalize domestic and given foreign wage rates, thus assuming the 
equivalent of a small trading economy. However, it seems more realistic to assume an 
exogenous inflow of labor, say determined by immigration restrictions, and let domestic 
wages adjust instead, assuming for simplicity that production adjustments in the sending 
and receiving countries together are observed without changes in world market prices  . 
With an exogenous determination of the labor inflow, the details of the wage differential vis 
à vis the foreign economy become irrelevant. 
p
Under the above assumptions, we have 
  ()() ( ) ( ) ( ) 00 0 0 0 0 , ,    and    , , gg g + g + + =⋅ Δ = Δ ⋅ vv pv pv v pv v pv v v v Δ  (1) 
  () ( ) 0010 ,    and    , gg == vv wp v wp v + Δ v
0 0
 (2) 
where a subscript   indicates the gradient vector of the GNP-function. Note that all vector 
products are defined as inner products. Suppose now that the government wants to make 
sure that all natives are made no worse off after immigration than before. One way to do 
this is to introduce specific indirect factor taxes, such that each native factor owner will 
have the same net-of-tax income available as before migration. The tax vector that satisfies 
this requirement is  . Of course, if for some factor  , then the 
mechanism implies a subsidy. A Pareto improvement is feasible, if the government budget 
from applying this TCS mechanism is strictly positive. 
v
1 =− tww 1 ii ww <
There are, of course, other redistributive mechanisms that the government may consider. 
But our choice here is not arbitrary. First of all, an indirect factor tax, by definition, satisfies 
the non-discrimination constraint emphasized above. And, equally important for our 
purpose, it has been shown that such a TCS mechanism does allow for a Pareto  
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improvement on the basis of gains from trade; see Dixit & Norman (1980) and Feenstra 
(2004).  
The net revenue from a non-discriminatory implementation of the mechanism is equal to 
  () ( ) 10 0 B =−⋅ Δ ww v v +  (3) 
The immigration surplus may be written as 
  () ( ) 01 , Sg + g =Δ − ⋅ Δ − pv v w v pv 0 ,  (4) 
which is simply the increase in GNP minus the wage payments to migrants. The net 
revenue from redistribution may be rewritten as 
   (5) 
It can be shown that  , whenever the composition of the inflow of factors is different 
from the initial endowment; see Felbermayr & Kohler (2007). If we assume that   also 
involves factors other than labor, then this condition is satisfied, if 
() 10 BS =+ − ⋅ Δ ww v
0 S >
0 v
0 > Δv  involves only 
labor.  
But the presence of a positive immigration surplus alone does not guarantee feasibility of 
our TCS mechanism, meaning that  . Indeed, it follows from concavity of the GNP-
function that the second term in equation (5) is non-positive. Concavity implies 
0 B ≥
  () ( ) ( ) 00 ,, , g+g g Δ≤ + ⋅ Δ v pv v pv pv v 0  (6) 
  () ( )( ) 00 0 ,, , gg + g + ≤Δ + Δ v pv pv v pv v v ⋅ Δ
w . G
 (8) 
hich implies that the c
+ =⋅ Δ −⋅−⋅ Δ wv vw vw v  (9) 
bserving that the first two terms on th
 (7) 
Notice that inequality (7) implies that  , which is in line with what we have just said, 
whereby   if and only if  1 w iven (2), inequalities (6) and (7) together imply 
  ()
0 S ≥
0 S > 0 0 −≠
10 0 −⋅ Δ ≤ ww v
w ontribution of immigrants to the net revenue of the TCS mechanism 
is non-positive. But the government still has the immigration surplus S  to draw upon, in 
order to finance redistribution. However, it is easy to see that this will not be enough. We 
rewrite 
  B () 10 0 0 0
O e right are equal to  ( )( ) ,, g+g Δ− pv v pv , we 
realize from (6) that  0 B ≤ . This is our impossibility theorem rplus 
does not permit a Pareto improvement through implementation of a TCS mechanism, 
00
: The immigration su 
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ination would the government need to impose against immigrants for 
applied on an equal footing to natives and migrants. We should like to emphasize once 
more that this same TCS mechanism works perfectly fine for a Pareto improvement for the 
gains from trade. 
How much discrim
Pareto improvement to become feasible? Suppose that the government is able and willing 
to openly discriminate against migrants, but assume that it can do so only uniformly across 
all types of labor. Let  () 0 1 * t − ww  be the vector of specific taxes/subsidies applied to 
foreign labor, with 0* t 1 ≤ < , while  0 1− ww  is applied to native labor. In other words, we 
assume that a foreign worker receives a lower subsidy than a native worker of the same 
type, but also pays a lower tax, should compensation require that type of labor to be 
taxed.
14 The typical case that we have in mind is one where wage rates are lowered for of 
all types of labor where immigration occurs, and factor price increases occur only for 
factors where there is no inflow. However, in our general case with arbitrarily many types 
of labor, complementarities between different types of labor may (but need not) generate an 
outcome where some type of labor benefits from a higher wage, even though there is an 
inflow of foreign labor of that type, alongside immigration of other types of labor. Of 
course,  0 1 0 i i ww −>  is ruled out, if there is no labor inflow other than  0 i v Δ>. Note that 
1* 1 t −< e degree of discrimination. 
 shown that such a discriminatory TCS g
 measures th





We may write (6) as 
                                                
  () 10 * BS t =+ − ⋅Δ ww v  
w urplus defined as in (4) above. We know from above that 
0 S >  whenever  10 0 −≠ ww . Hence, unless the immigration surplus is zero to start with, 
 implies B  implies a Pareto improvement. This is the trivial solution of 
t discrim n. The interesting question is whether a Pareto improvement may also 
be achieved through less than perfect discrimination, i.e., with an interior value of 
0* 1 t << . 
e S  is the immigration s
*0 t = 0 > ,
 
14 Of course, a more “efficient” way of discrimination would be to grant lower subsidies to foreign workers (if 
compensation requires some factor to be subsidized), and at the same time impose higher taxes on foreign 
labor (if compensation requires some factor to be taxed). This could still be implemented in a uniform way 
across all types of labor.  
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0 0 ,   w i t h   0 1 g γγ + ⋅ Δ ≤≤ pv w v  (11) 
he “parameter”
  () 0 , g+ Δ= pv v ( ) ( )
T  γ  measures the degree of concavity of the GNP-function. It should be 
noted, however, that γ  is specific to the labor inflow Δv , with the limiting case  1 γ =  
indicating a linear segment of the GNP-function (factor p e insensitivity), in which   
there will be no factor price change from 
ric case
Δv , i.e.,  10 0 − = ww . More specifically, γ  is 
determined by the second order derivatives of the GNP-function  () , g ⋅Δ pv v, as we 
shall see below. From (4), the immigration surplus may be rewritten a





















1 γ = , we have 
15 What is the interpretation of condition (13)? We know from  *1 t = .
above that 01 γ ≤≤  and () 0 −⋅ Δ ≤ ww v .  0 10 Γ ≤  measures the extent to which the factor 
price chang lues” ereby strict inequality (no factor price 
insensitivity) is required for an immigration surplus to arise at all. For “marginal” 
immigration, the surplus vanishes, but we look at a discrete labor inflow, and Γ  captures 
the gain on infra-marginal units. The larger (in absolute value) these infra-marginal effects, 
the lower – other things equal – the required degree of discrimination 1* t − . However, 
other things are not equal, since 
e “deva  the labor inflow, wh
Γ   as well as γ   are both driven by the same forces. 
Unfortunately, however, they are in ersely related. The larger absolute value of  v γ  (lower 
degree of concavity), the lower the absolute value of Γ , and  1 γ =  implies  10 0 −= ww . 
Without going into further details, the conclusion must therefore  hat a unif r 
level of discrimination 1* 1 t −<  solving our problem need not exist. The intuitive reason is 
that factor complementa ay give rise to wage increases for immigrant labor, in which 
case our “discriminatory” TCS system works against the government’s budget constraint. 
Suppose that instead of an open discrimination, the TCS mechanism is inherently sensitiv
be t orm interio
rities m
e 
to the type of labor inflow. For instance, part of the labor inflow might be temporary, and 
                                                 
15 This is added for formal reasons only, since in this case  0 Γ = , as mentioned above. In this case, the 
immigration surplus is zero and a Pareto improvement is trivially ruled out.  
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wh  takes permanent residence, 1
discrimination is allowed for temporary migrants. This is a partial relaxation of the non-
discrimination constraint. Moreover, some of the foreign labor may enter the country 
without people taking residence. We may either think of cross-border commuting, or of 
certain types of services trade.
16 Wage income paid to such non-resident foreign labor may 
simply not be within reach of the domestic TCS mechanism. Again, we may view this as a 
partial relaxation of the non-discrimination constraint. Might such a relaxation help towards 
a Pareto improvement? Can we identify conditions under which this is possible? 
Let Z  be a diagonal matrix such that element  i z  indicates the share of type-i labor inflow 
ich is i z −  thus being the share which for the above reasons 
, where 
is beyond the reach of the TCS mechanism The government budget (3) then reads 




10 0 () , g −≈ ⋅ Δ vv ww p v v ( ) 0 vv
and colu ors, as the dimensional requirements for 
meaningful vector and matrix multiplication are obvious. The government budget of the 
TCS mechanism emerges as 
  ()
, g pv  indicates the negative semi-definite matrix 
of second-order endowment-derivatives of the GNP-function. We abstain from explicit 
distinction between row  mn vect
( ) 00 0 00 0 ,, Bg g ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ≈⋅ ⋅ ⋅+⋅ ⋅ ⋅⋅ Δ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ vv vv vM p v vvM p vZv  (14) 
In this expression, M  is a diagonal matrix of immigration rates,  0 i ii vm v Δ = .  
Equation (14) may seem rather complex, but it is revealing. Again, a Pareto improvement 
. The first term  the imm
t is st
r 
                                                
requires that   on the right-hand side of (14) is igration surplus  0 B >
, S   which we know from above to be non-negative. Indeed, since we have assumed 
00 ⋅≠ vMv , i rictly positive. In other words, in the aggregate there is complementarity 
ween immigration and domestic factors. The magnitude of the surplus is governed by 
y between the migration rates in M and the factor price effects given by the 
second-order derivatives of the GNP-function. This is the first bracketed term on the right. 




16 The above view of services trade holds for some of the cases falling under Modes 1 and 2 of the GATS. See 
Bhagwati, Panagariya & Srinivasan (2004) for a discussion of different modes of trade in services provided 
for by the GATS.  
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tures the cost of applying the TCS mechanism to immigrants. 
factor prices where there is no inflow, but a large domestic endowment, are responsible for 
a large immigration surplus. 
The second term of (14) cap
Here, we observe a somewhat more intricate interaction between the pattern of 
complementarity, given by the matrix  ( ) 0 , g ⋅ vv Mp v , and the pattern of permanent 
domestic residence of migrants, captured   Z . Generally, if factors that are 
significant beneficiary of complementarity with respect to immigration are non-migrants, or 
migrants with a low share of domestic residence, then application of the TCS mechanism to 
migrants will generate low revenue. Similarly, if factors that suffer from substitutability 
with respect to immigration are also factors with a large inflow of migrants with permanent 
domestic residence (large  i z ), this generates a large budgetary cost from applying the TCS 
mechanism. This type of interaction is captured by the second bracketed term in equation 
(14) above. The channels responsible for whether or not a Pareto improvement will result 
from a TCS mechanism with weakened non-discrimination are thus relatively easy to 
identify in principle, but it is very difficult to imagine that a government may target the 
matrices M  and Z  in a deliberate attempt to achieve a Pareto improvement without open 
discrimination in its compensation effort.  
by the matrix
5.  Conclusions 
lobalization has winners and losers. Arguably, compensating losers is important, in order 
ency gains facilitate compensatory mechanisms, in 
 
G
to maintain political support for policies aiming at gains from globalization. Large 
international discrepancies in wage rates indicate that the gains from further migration are 
very large, indeed larger than gains from further trade or capital flows. Indeed, international 
migration seems a very powerful instrument in the fight against poverty. Unfortunately, it is 
also the form of globalization facing the largest political resistance. Rich countries are 
gating their labor markets through tight immigration restrictions. To a large extent, the 
explanation lies in wide-spread fear of unwelcome labor market effects in receiving 
countries, particularly regarding wages.  
Economists routinely point out that effici
order to achieve a Pareto improvement. A well-known result states that the gains from trade 
may be turned into a Pareto improvement through a suitably designed system of indirect  
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a ge gains from 
he political restriction that immigration should be made a Pareto improvement 
to avoid the conclusion that 
                                                
taxes/subsidies on goods and factors. We have shown that the same is not true for gains 
from migration, if the tax-cum-subsidy system is to be applied on an equal footing to 
natives and migrants. Compensation thus seems inherently more difficult for migration than 
for other forms of globalization that do not involve movement of people. At the same time, 
the potential for efficiency gains from migration seems particularly large. One should add 
here that such gains may even accrue to the non-migrant part of the sending country, if the 
prospect of emigration enhances the incentives to human capital formation.
17
We thus face an awkward finding. There is the plausible hypothesis that l r
migration are negated by fear of distributional effects in receiving countries. And there is 
our result that compensatory mechanisms towards Pareto improvement that work for other 
forms of globalization do not work for migration, unless we allow for discrimination 
against migrants in the way the compensation mechanism is employed. What are we to 
conclude? 
Accepting t
among natives of the receiving country, a possible conclusion seems to be that we must 
head for more redistribution from migrants to natives in the receiving countries. This is, 
indeed the conclusion drawn by Freeman (2006) who notes that „the only way I can think 
of to increase the receptivity of destination countries to accept  more immigrants would be  
(to) redistribute the benefits of immigration so that a greater share of the benefits flow to 
natives and a lower share to the benefits of migrants” (p.165). The conclusion is delicate, 
however. One might argue that it puts too much weight on the welfare of (rich?) natives in 
receiving countries. Why should alleviation of world poverty through migration be put 
under the restriction that all rich country natives stand to gain? 
However, if we do accept this restriction there seems no way 
we should rethink the requirement of non-discrimination in compensatory mechanisms 
employed to compensate losers from migration. One may hesitate, or even regard this as 
outrageous. But if the price of non-discrimination is maintaining tight immigration 
restrictions, we should not forget about the discrimination that is induced by these 
restrictions. It is discrimination among the would-be migrants, on sometimes dubious 
 
17 Such a „brain gain“ (as opposed to the oft-quoted „brain drain“) arises, if skill formation is subject to a 
positive externality, and if some of those enticed into skill formation do not emigrate. This was first pointed 
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